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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellants (hereafter "Marek"), have appealed the Memorandum Decision and Order 
entered by District Court Judge Bradbury on November 22, 2010. Said court granted the 
Respondents' (hereafter "Lawrence") Motion For Reconsideration regarding their Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Marek is appealing the Judgment entered on March 25, 2011, 
and Amended Judgment entered on April 29, 2001, by District Court Judge Griffin. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The underlying subject matter of this action is real property owned by Marek and adjacent 
real property owned by Lawrence located in Clearwater County, State of Idaho. The parties own 
lands generally falling on the western and eastern sides, and within the northern comers, of 
Clearwater County sections 26 and 27; Marek owning the property on the western side of the line, 
in the northwest comer of section 27, and Lawrence owning the property on the eastern side of the 
line, in the northeast comer of section 26. Marek claims that the boundary between the properties 
follows the surveyed section line between sections 26 and 27; while Lawrence claims that the 
boundary line should be Three Bear Road, which generally runs north up the section line but deviates 
west off the section line before the northern comer. Lawrence claims that this should be the 
boundary line by either adverse possession, express boundary by agreement, or by implied boundary 
by agreement. 
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Lawrence filed a motion for summary judgment on the theory of adverse possession. Said 
motion was denied. Lawrence then filed a second motion for summary judgment. The District Court 
denied to grant summary judgment on Lawrence's claims of adverse possession, express boundary 
by agreement, and implied boundary by agreement. See Record, pg. 55-63. Lawrence then filed a 
motion for reconsideration. See Record, pg. 48-50. The District Court reaffirmed its denial of 
boundary by agreement but held that the boundary line asserted by Lawrence is the correct boundary 
line based on the language of that deed alone. See Record, pg. 28. 
The deed in question was a Warranty Deed executed on August 8, 1985, fromR.C. Johnson 
to Laura Adamson (Marek's predecessor in interest). Said deed conveyed real property located in 
Clearwater County, Idaho, described as "Sec 27, 38 N, 1 W El/2 NESE, LESS S 36', AND LESS 
1.06 AC ROAD RIGHT OF WAY IN SECT 27 RECORDED NO 108078." See Record, pg. 73. 
Subsequently, a Judgment was entered on March 25, 2011. See Record, pg. 22-25. An 
Amended Judgment was then entered on April 29, 2011. See Record, pg. 18-21. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in questions of law when interpreting the deed of 
conveyance at issue in this matter and by determining the boundary between the 
parties' property. 
2. Whether the District Court erred entering a Judgment that does not 
correspond/comply with what was Ordered in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
dated November 22, 2010. 
ARGUMENT 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order regarding Lawrence's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the District Court held that the language of the Johnson-Adamson Deed was subject to 
conflicting interpretations and thus summary judgment finding the boundary line by expressed 
agreement was inappropriate. See Record, pg. 59-60. 
On reconsideration, the District Court changed its mind and stated: 
Although the Lawrences's counterclaim for boundary by agreement fails, I 
have nonetheless reconsidered my conclusion in my previous opinion considering 
possible interpretations of the Johnson-Adamson deed. I now conclude that, based 
on the language of that deed alone, the boundary line asserted by the Lawrences is the 
correct boundary line. Under Idaho case-law, the "primary goal" in interpreting and 
construing deeds is to "give effect to the real intention of the parties." Porter v. 
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404 (2008). In my previous opinion I held that, by 
referencing a section line, the Johnson-Adamson deed could be construed to place 
the boundary line according to wherever the section line might one day be surveyed 
to lay. However, I now hold that this conclusion was incorrect. 
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When a landowner sells off a portion of his land, he certainly has in mind an 
on-the-ground location where his property will thereafter end and the purchaser's 
property will begin. Additionally, the purchaser certainly has an on-the-ground 
location in mind as to where her property line is located. Therefore, when Mr. 
Johnson referenced Section 27 in deeding part of his land to Ms. Adamson, he did 
not mean to grant away part of his land and end up not knowing for certain where his 
new boundary lay. Rather, he meant to create a new boundary for himself in a 
particular location. And, of course, Ms. Adamson meant to purchase land with a 
boundary in a particular location. Therefore, in referencing Section 27, Mr. Johnson 
and Ms. Adamson could only have meant to determine their new boundaries 
according to where they then believed the eastern line of Section 27 to lay, not 
wherever it might one day be surveyed to lay. 
See Record, pg. 28-29. 
The District Court then stated that the Mareks presented no evidence on where Mr. Johnson 
or Ms. Adamson believed that the Section 26-27 line ran but that the Lawrences did present evidence 
showing where Mr. Johnson and Ms. Adamson believed the section line to lay. See Record, pg. 29. 
The District Court then concluded: 
... that when a party selling off part of his land references section lines, he and the 
buyer do not mean the section lines wherever they might one day be surveyed. They 
deal with the reality at the time the deed is executed, i.e., where the buyer and seller 
believe them to lay. Therefore, when R.C. Johnson conveyed what is now the 
Marek's property to Laura Adamson, he conveyed her the land west of the section 
line where he and she believed it to lay, minus the Three Bear Road. The 
uncontroverted evidence presented by the Lawrences shows that Mr. Johnson and 
Ms. Adamson believed the section 26-27 boundary line to run up the middle of Three 
Bear Road, continuing north where the road veers to the west. Thus, that line (minus 
the road) is the boundary between the Mareks's and Lawrences's properties, set up 
by their predecessors, R.C. Johnson and Laura Adamson. 
See Record, pg. 31. 
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The District Court's decision in this matter is flawed in numerous respects. The District 
Court failed to identify the appropriate law and failed to apply the appropriate law regarding deeds 
of conveyance. 
In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give 
effect to the real intention of the parties. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 
(2008). Where a deed is unambiguous the parties' intent must be ascertained from the language of 
the deed as a matter oflaw without resort to extrinsic evidence. C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 
766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). However, if the language of the deed is ambiguous, ascertaining the 
parties' intent is a question of fact and may therefore only be settled by a trier of fact. Porter, 146 
Idaho at 404, 195 P.3d at 1217. Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is subject 
to conflicting interpretations. Id. at 404, 195 P.3d at 1217. The trier of fact must then determine the 
intent of the parties according to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction. Id. at 404, 195 P.3d at 1217. Conflicting interpretations may arise when no potential 
boundary line unambiguously fits the language contained in the deed. Porter, 146 Idaho at 404, 195 
P.3d at 1217. Similarly, conflicting interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself, without 
contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings. Id. at 404, 195 P.3d at 1217. 
A proper analysis of the Johnson-Adamson Deed required the District Court to determine 
whether or not the Deed was ambiguous. If the Deed is unambiguous then the parties' intent must 
be determined from the language of the Deed without resort to extrinsic evidence. If the District 
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Court found that the Deed was ambiguous then the parties' intent is a question of fact and must be 
settled by the trier of fact. The trier of fact must determine the intent of the parties according to the 
language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
While the District Court never referred to the Deed as ambiguous or unambiguous, its clear 
from its decision that the District Court first held that the Deed was ambiguous and then, on 
reconsideration, held that the Deed was unambiguous. After finding the Deed unambiguous, the 
District Court then considered evidence outside the Deed to determine where the Section 26-27 line 
lay. 
A. The District Court's decision that the deed was unambiguous was correct but its 
reasoning was legally flawed. 
Mareks contend that the Adamson-Johnson Deed is unambiguous. That the Deed merely 
excludes the right of way and does not incorporate a line mentioned in the right of way deed as the 
boundary line of the property. The plain language of the Deed supports this interpretation and more 
importantly a different interpretation is not reasonable based on the language of the Deed. The 
boundary line, the Section 26-27 line, unambiguously fits the language in the Deed. Furthermore, 
the plain language of the Deed does not lend itself to inconsistent means without contortion. The 
language of the Deed clearly sets the boundary of the Marek's property as where the Section 26-27 
line lays. The method to determine where the Section 26-27 line lays is via a survey. 
While the District Court changes its position and ultimately determines that the Deed is 
unambiguous, its holding to justify that the Deed is unambiguous makes no sense and is not 
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supported by any law. The District Court held that the section line in the Deed (which is the 
boundary line) is not the section line as surveyed but where the parties thought the section line lay. 
This holding conflicts with the plain meaning of the language in the Deed. The Deed references the 
section line only. It does not reference the section line where the parties think it might be. The 
District Court subjectively contorts the plain meaning of the language of the Deed. Obviously such 
a subjective contortion would undermine all deeds and is improper. 
The District Court held that the Deed in question is unambiguous. While the Deed is 
unambiguous, the District Court erred as a matter of law by failing to ascertain the parties' intent 
from the language of the Deed. As such, Marek respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
District Court's decision on this issue, find that the Deed is unambiguous, and enter an order that the 
parties intent must be construed from the plain meaning of the language of the Deed - which sets the 
boundary line as where the Section 26-27 line lays. 
B. The District Court impermissibly considered extrinsic evidence after determining the 
deed to be unambiguous. 
After finding that the Deed in question was unambiguous, the District Court proceeded to 
consider extrinsic evidence to support its holding. Considering extrinsic evidence when a deed is 
unambiguous is an error as a matter of law. Marek respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
District Court's decision on this issue. 
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C. The Judgment and Amended Judgment entered by the District Court are inconsistent 
with the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 22, 
2010. 
The Judgment, and Amended Judgment, entered by the District Court in this matter is 
inconsistent with the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 22, 
2010 and should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
While the District Court found that the Deed in question was unambiguous, it erred as a 
matter oflaw by failing to ascertain the parties' intent from the language of the Deed. The District 
Court also erred as a matter oflaw by impermissibly considering extrinsic evidence after finding that 
the Deed was unambiguous. Finally, the Judgment, and Amended Judgment, entered by the District 
Court in this matter is inconsistent with the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
entered on November 22, 2010. As such, Marek respectfully requests this Court set aside the 
Judgment, and Amended Judgment, find that the Deed is unambiguous, and enter an order that the 
parties intent must be construed from the plain meaning of the language of the Deed- which sets the 
boundary line as where the Section 26-27 line lays. 
DATED this /-jlf; day of September, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /3# day of September, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Mark Snyder 
P.O. Box 626 
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